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Measuring the Effect of Institutional Change on Gender Inequality in the 
Labour Market 
 
Abstract 
This article examines the differential impact of labour market institutions on women and men. It 
carries out longitudinal analyses using repeat cross-sectional data from the EU Labour Force Survey 
1992-2007 as well as time series data that measure institutional change over the same period. The 
results contribute to the literature on gendered employment, adding important insights into the 
impact of labour market institutions over and above family policies that have been the focus of most 
prior studies on the topic. We find differential effects of institutional change on male and female 
outcome. Our findings challenge the neo-classical literature on the topic. While our results suggest 
that men benefit more clearly than women from increases in employment protection, we do not 
find support for the neo-classical assertion that strong trade unions decrease female employment. 
IŶstead, iŶĐƌeasiŶg uŶioŶ stƌeŶgth is shoǁŶ to haǀe ďeŶefiĐial effeĐts foƌ ďoth ŵeŶ͛s aŶd ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
likelihood of being employed on the standard employment contract. Furthermore, in line with other 
researchers, we find that rising levels of in kind state suppoƌt to faŵilies iŵpƌoǀe ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
employment opportunities.   
 
Keywords: collective bargaining coverage, employment protection, European Labour Force 
Survey, gender inequality, institutional change, labour market stratification 
 
Introduction 
A ͚UŶified TheoƌǇ͛ oƌigiŶatiŶg fƌoŵ U“ AŵeƌiĐaŶ laďouƌ eĐoŶoŵists ;Blau aŶd KahŶ, ϮϬϬϮͿ Đlaiŵs 
that the AŵeƌiĐaŶ laďouƌ ŵaƌket͛s loǁ uŶeŵploǇŵeŶt ƌates aƌe a fuŶĐtioŶ of its deƌegulated 
institutions which allow high earnings inequality and considerable employment growth. This 
research examines the employment-population ratio, i.e. the share of adults of working age in 
employment, and compares the employment rates of the US economy to those of Europe. The neo-
classical literature on the topic argues that European economies stifle employment growth with 
their rigid institutional frameworks. Moreover, this work contends that Europe will never be able to 
solve its unemployment crisis without a concerted effort to deregulate its employment law and its 
unions, with these institutions characterised as market interventions that stand in the path of 
market equilibrium and lower unemployment. A specific variant of the argument focuses on the 
heterogeneous institutional effects of macro-economic structures on labour market outcome. It 
looks beyond the implications of protective and regulating institutions for overall labour market 
performance, and focuses on variation in labour market outcomes for different socio-demographic 
groups. Regulation, so the argument goes, acts to the advantage of male prime-age workers, who 
are described as labour market insiders. Labour market outsiders (consisting of women, the low 
skilled, labour market entrants and older workers, immigrants and the unemployed) are presented 
as disadvantaged in rigid labour markets (see e.g. Bertola et al., 2007; Kahn, 2007). Moreover, 
deregulation is presented as a way of opening up the labour market, offering outsiders more 
opportunities for employment and hence reducing demographic inequalities in employment rates 
(e.g. ibid.). The vast majority of existing empirical work concerned with heterogeneous institutional 
effects has examined differentials in outcome by skill level (e.g. Daniel and Siebert, 2005; Gebel and 
Giesecke, 2011; Maurin and Postel-Vinay, 2005; Oesch, 2010). Other inequality dimensions have 
ƌeĐeiǀed ŵuĐh less atteŶtioŶ to date. This studǇ͛s theoƌetiĐal aŶd eŵpiƌiĐal foĐus is oŶ the 
relationship between gender inequality in labour market outcomes and labour market regulation. It 
contributes to the debate with an empirical test of the effeĐt of ͛pƌoteĐtiǀe iŶstitutioŶs͛ oŶ geŶdeƌed 
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labour market outcome, by examining the heterogeneous effects of changes in national policies and 
institutional set-ups overtime.  
Our dependent variable examines the full-range of labour market statuses (covering 
employment, unemployment and inactivity) and also examines variations in forms of employment 
by contract type and working-time. Such an approach allows us to holistically identify which labour 
market categories and which forms of employment are likely to increase or decrease as a result of 
institutional change. This is an important extension of previous work (e.g. Bertola et al., 2007) as it 
allows us to (1) comprehensively determine where employment gains are coming from, be it from 
unemployment or inactivity (a category disproportionately populated by women), and to (2) identify 
the calibre of employment change, i.e. do we observe increases in full-time permanent employment, 
a positive outcome, as opposed to gains in marginal employment, a less positive outcome. As our 
study looks at gender differences in outcome it also considers the impact of family policies, which 
are known to affect female labour supply (e.g. Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Steiber and Haas, 
2012). Our paper therefore seeks to contribute to existing work concerned with heterogeneous 
effects of labour market institutions whilst also engaging with and complementing existing literature 
on the impact of welfare state policy on gendered employment outcomes.  
Our study of 18 European countries uses micro-data from the European Labour Force Survey 
(EULFS) as well as high-quality time-series data measuring institutional change spanning a 16-year 
period (1992-2007). Our methodological focus is on institutional change within a longitudinal 
framework. Estimating fixed-effects models and focusing on within-country institutional variation 
allows us to tackle endogeneity problems (see e.g. Gebel and Giesecke, 2011 for a similar strategy) 
and estimate more robust effects than cross-sectional analyses which are limited to between-
country variation of institutional effects. The paper proceeds as follows: we begin with a review of 
the theoretical accounts on the topic and provide a discussion of the potential mechanisms behind 
the structuring effects of institutions on gendered outcome. After describing our data and analytical 
strategy, we present our results. The final section concludes.  
 
Background and Aims 
Analyses of gender inequalities in market outcome have been a keystone of sociological research for 
a loŶg tiŵe. Eaƌlieƌ ǁoƌk teŶded to foĐus oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s ƌight to paid ǁoƌk, and was an early rallying 
cry (e.g. Orloff, 1993, Cockburn, 1991). Yet despite progressive chaŶges iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s labour market 
engagement (Scott et al., 2008), decreases in the gender pay gap (Rubery and Grimshaw, 2014) and 
a massive expansion of women in higher education (e.g. Blossfeld and Jänichen, 1992), notable 
gender inequalities in labour market participation persist. It is ofteŶ aƌgued that ŵeŶ͛s unequal 
engagement in unpaid care work (Lister, ϮϬϬϯͿ leads to ǁoŵeŶ͛s ͚outsideƌ͛ laďouƌ ŵaƌket status, 
evidenced in their lower participation rates, their family related career interruptions and their strong 
involvement in part-time employment. WoŵeŶ͛s weaker attachment to paid work is held to 
discourage employers from hiring them into high-status positions which require high levels of on-
the-job training. Employers aƌe said to ͚statistically discriminate͛ against women as they perceive 
them to have lower work commitment and lower productivity levels than comparable men. This 
discriminatory behaviour is argued to be consequential for the gender gap in employment and pay. 
While gender differences in employment outcomes are universal phenomena, the extent of gender 
inequality varies substantially across countries. This has triggered cross-nationally comparative work 
focusing on macro-level dynamics and examining the role of national welfare policies and cultures 
on the gender gap in labour market participation and attainment (e.g. Stier et al., 2001; Mandel and 
Semyonov, 2006; Cooke, 2011; Pettit and Hook, 2012). This cross-nationally comparative work has 
revealed a ͚paƌtiĐipatioŶ-segregatioŶ͛ ;MaŶdel aŶd “eŵǇoŶoǀ, 2006) or an ͚iŶĐlusioŶ-iŶeƋualitǇ͛ 
trade-off (Petit and Hook, 2012) which results from state policy seeking to integrate women into 
͚feŵale fƌieŶdlǇ͛ eŵploǇŵeŶt. While suĐh effoƌts iŶdeed ƌesult iŶ sigŶifiĐaŶt iŶĐƌeases iŶ feŵale 
labour force participation, they also have the unintended effect of increasing/maintaining gender 
inequalities in terms of occupational attainment and earnings. Mandel and Semyonov (2006, p.1911) 
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explain how the provision of ͚female friendly͛ employment conditions offered by the public sector 
ƌeiŶfoƌĐes Ŷoƌŵatiǀe eǆpeĐtatioŶs of ǁoŵeŶ as pƌiŵaƌǇ Đaƌeƌs ǁhiĐh seƌǀe to ŵaiŶtaiŶ all ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
economic disadvantage by increasing statistical discrimination and occupational segregation. Recent 
contributions on the implications of welfare policies on gender inequality have shown that 
institutional effects are conditioned by socio-economic class. Cooke (2011) examines the 
intersection of gender and class, revealing how class equality is sometimes achieved at the expense 
of gender inequality. Countries which have protected working-Đlass ǁoƌkeƌs͛ ƌights aƌe also 
countries where it is difficult for outsiders to access the higher echelons. Similarly, Mandel (2012) 
presents evidence that welfare state policies have differential effeĐts oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s eaƌŶiŶgs: ǁhile 
they have the potential to mitigate the gender pay gap for low-skilled women, they can actually 
increase it for high-skilled women. 
While the existing work on gender inequality in the labour market had as its predominant 
focus the role of welfare state institutions, our core interest lies with labour market institutions and 
their structuring effect on inequality (though we also examine welfare policies). By focusing on 
change in labour market institutions we want to complement existing work on the macro-level 
influences on gender inequalities in labour market outcome, while at the same time empirically 
scrutinising the theoretical assumption of the neo-classical perspective that protective labour 
market institutions are detrimental for labour market outsiders (e.g. Bertola et al., 2007). The 
literature reviewed above underscores the importance of analyses that go beyond an assessment of 
employment rates to ones that provide a more holistic assessment of labour market outcome. In an 
effort to engage with the integration-segregation paradox, this paper therefore investigates seven 
different labour market outcomes, providing a distinction between inactivity and unemployment 
and differentiating employment by contract type and working-time. We investigate the extent to 
which women are excluded from the standard employment contract (i.e. full-time permanent 
employment) and examine how change in labour market institutions either supports their access to 
standard employment contracts or peripheralises them to alternative, and broadly inferior, labour 
market statuses.  
Our contribution focuses on medium-skilled women and men. The medium-skilled constitute 
the largest labour force group in most countries analysed and so the results we report are relevant 
for the majority skill level of workers. By controlling for skill our strategy does – to some extent – 
address the problem of the potential interaction between labour market institutions and ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
socio-economic status (cf. Mandel, 2012). Another strategy would have been to analyse different 
skill categories. Yet it is a strategy that is incompatible with our analyses which distinguish gendered 
differences in five forms of employment as well as in unemployment and inactivity (seven outcomes 
overall). Were we to  attempt an investigation of the effect of institutional change on seven labour 
market outcomes for women and men and for three different skills groups (the low, medium, and 
high educated) we would need to assess forty-two labour market outcomes: 7 outcomes x 2 (by 
gender) x 3 (by skill level). Such an analysis would clearly be beyond the scope of one research 
article. A strategy of comparing labour market outcomes by gender and skill level would be most 
suitable for a research paper on one or perhaps two outcomes, but not seven. We therefore present 
results for the modal skill group of the European labour force and refer the reader to pre-existing 
work on the complexities of the relationship between the labour market institutions examined here 
and skill-based distributions of labour market risks (Gebel and Giesecke, 2011). 
 
Theoretical Considerations 
 
Trade Unions 
 
Neoclassical economic theory assumes that unions are responsible for the marginalisation of market 
͚outsideƌs͛ ;e.g. Beƌtola et al., 2007). At its most basic, trade unions are seen to compress the wage 
distribution, increasing the wages of labour market outsiders by setting high wage floors (Card et al., 
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ϮϬϬϯͿ. Tƌade uŶioŶs theƌeďǇ iŵpose ƌestƌiĐtioŶs oŶ eŵploǇeƌs͛ aďilitǇ to hiƌe ǁoƌkeƌs ďeloǁ ǁage 
minima or outside union agreements, (allegedly) resulting in a decrease in low paid jobs. This 
dynamic is freƋueŶtlǇ ƌefeƌƌed to as a ͚ĐƌoǁdiŶg out͛ of laďouƌ ŵaƌket outsideƌs ďǇ tƌade uŶioŶs 
because outsiders (e.g. the low-skilled, labour market entrants, older workers, and women) are 
considered to be less productive and employers deem the collectively bargained wages too high for 
these laďouƌ ŵaƌket gƌoups. The theoƌǇ aƌgues that uŶioŶs aĐĐept suĐh ͚diseŵploǇŵeŶt͛ effeĐts foƌ 
women and other labour market outsiders as these are considered to have a more elastic labour 
supply, that is, ͞employment loss [for them] is less costly because the value of the alternative uses of 
time is closer to that of being employed͟ ;Beƌtola et al., 2007: p. 834).1 
The neo-classical perspective, which argues that stronger unions are more likely to price 
women out of the labour market, can be challenged however. In their pursuit of the idealised 
unsegregated labour market, neo-classical economic models frequently ignore gender segregated 
employment, which entails that men and women often do not compete for the same positions. 
HeŶĐe, the ǀieǁ that ǁoŵeŶ aƌe Đƌoǁded out fƌoŵ iŶsideƌs͛ joďs assuŵes aŶ opeŶ aŶd uŶstƌuĐtuƌed 
market that does not exist. Taking account of the gender-segregated nature of most labour markets, 
one could even argue that a wider union coverage will increase the chance that not only traditionally 
ŵale seĐtoƌs aƌe Đoǀeƌed ďut also ͚feŵale͛ segŵeŶts ;e.g. the pƌiǀate seƌǀiĐe seĐtoƌͿ. This ŵaǇ lead 
to reduced levels of gender inequality in employment outcome. More generally, while in the past 
trade unions have been accused of peripheralising female workers͛ ĐoŶĐeƌŶs, iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ ǁoƌkiŶg 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s Ŷeeds aƌe ďeiŶg ƌeĐogŶised aŶd ĐaŵpaigŶed oŶ ďǇ tƌade uŶioŶs ;MĐBƌide, ϮϬϬϬͿ. IŶstead 
of intensifying the divide between so-classed insiders and outsiders, regulation imposed by unions 
Đould thus aĐt to Đƌeate ŵoƌe iŶĐlusiǀe laďouƌ ŵaƌkets iŶ ǁhiĐh ͚ǀulŶeƌaďle͛ gƌoups ďeĐoŵe iŶsideƌs 
(Rubery, 2011: p. 1106). Hence, trade unions, in their support of women workers, may decrease – 
rather than increase – gendered market inequalities ďǇ also ďaƌgaiŶiŶg foƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to 
standard employment.  
Notwithstanding whether stronger unions are thought to have negative or positive effects 
on labour market performance and inequality, their impact is expected to vary with the level of 
coordination. Political economy scholars traditionally emphasise positive union effects on labour 
market performance (e.g. Hall, 2001)2 and assume that desirable labour market effects of unions 
strengthen monotonically with the level of coordination (e.g. Streeck and Schmitter, 1985). Calmfors 
aŶd Dƌiffill ;ϭϵϴϴͿ, ďǇ ĐoŶtƌast, iŶtƌoduĐed a ͚huŵp-shape͛ hǇpothesis. With the general expectation 
that unions are detrimental for labour market performance, they argue that union strength is less 
harmful in economies with either highly coordinated (at the national level) or uncoordinated (at the 
firm level) bargaining, while strong unions will have particularly detrimental effects in economies 
with medium levels of coordiŶatioŶ. UŶioŶs͛ ǁage ďaƌgaiŶiŶg iŶ suĐh ĐoŶteǆts is Đlaiŵed to ďe less 
moderate than that of unions in highly coordinated or uncoordinated economies where bargaining 
outcomes are more likely to account for macroeconomic conditions and wage externalities (Traxler 
and Kittel, 2000).  
In summary, a neo-classical framework offers predictions of high male/female differentials 
in labour market risks in countries with stronger trade unions (which we measure by looking at 
collective bargaining coverage (CBC)). If the assumptions of this perspective hold, we would expect 
                                                          
1
 Note that the Political Economy literature also argues that unions can be detrimental for female employment 
outcome. Rather than arguing that unions price women out of employment, the Political Economy argument 
hinges on the role of skill regimes. It is theorised that in national contexts with strong unions both workers and 
employers have incentives to invest in specific skills. However, such contexts put women who tend to have 
career interruptions at a greater disadvantage as firm-specific human capital depreciates with career 
interruptions (Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2010: p. 61-62). This is held to have negative implications for their 
employment rate, while women in general skill regimes which tend to go hand in hand with weak unionisation 
experience a lower relative disadvantage (ibid.). 
2
 Again, while writers from the Political Economy School understand unions to exert positive union effects on 
(aggregate) employment outcome, they do not necessarily believe this to be the case for women. 
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that rising levels of CBC make it more likely that women are crowded out of the labour market – in 
particular out of permanent jobs. Assuming a hump-shaped effect of coordination, these negative 
implications of increased union strength for women should be most pronounced in national contexts 
with medium levels of coordination. An alternative perspective – challenging the assumptions of 
neo-classical economic theory – would predict that both men and women benefit from increases in 
trade union power. This would be evidenced by increased levels of permanent employment and a 
reduced prevalence of atypical employment, unemployment or inactivity. Moreover, adopting a 
political economy perspective concerning the mediating role of coordination, we would hypothesise 
that the positive employment effects of increasing union strength grows monotonically with level of 
coordination. 
 
Employment Protection Legislation and the Regulation of Temporary Work 
 
Employment protection legislation (EPL) is often seen to protect labour market insiders at the 
expense of outsiders. EPL imposes financial and procedural obligations on employers should they 
want to terminate employment contracts. In more rigid economies legal regulations as well as 
labour court decisions can make it both time-consuming and expensive to lay off permanent 
employees (see for instance Mertens et al., 2007; OECD, 2004: chapter 2). In more flexible 
(deregulated) economies, weaker EPL allows employers to hire and fire with fewer procedural 
inconveniences and at lower cost. This liberal system is seen to be less disadvantageous for women 
than highly regulated systems that make it considerably more difficult to fire insiders on permanent 
contracts. Hence, according to macroeconomic theory employers have fewer incentives for hiring 
and consequently there will be fewer job openings in more rigid labour markets. Women are more 
strongly affected by restricted hiring than men given their tendency for discontinuous careers (Kahn, 
2007; OECD, 2004). The negative impact of stricter EPL on hiring incentives may not only affect 
women who aim to re-enter the labour market after family-related employment interruptions. For 
reasons of statistical disĐƌiŵiŶatioŶ, ƌigid eŵploǇŵeŶt pƌoteĐtioŶ ŵaǇ iŶ faĐt depƌess all ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
chances of obtaining open-ended employment contracts irrespective of the continuity of their 
employment careers. Employers in higher EPL contexts are more risk averse in their hiring behaviour 
than their counterparts in lower EPL labour markets and may avoid offering women a permanent 
contract due to concerns over their allegedly weak labour market attachment and commitment as it 
would be hard to dismiss a woman if she indeed turned out to be of low productivity. This would 
suggest that the risks of statistical discrimination would be greater in contexts with stricter EPL, and 
that women are more likely to be hired outside of the standard employment contract.  
While the neo-classical perspective underscores the problematic nature of employment 
regulation for women as labour market outsiders, an alternative perspective could emphasise that 
employed women are likely to benefit from stricter employment protection as it lowers their risk of 
job loss. Stricter employment protection legislation is likely to contain (more effective) stipulations 
protecting women during their maternity leave thereby increasing their chances of continuous 
labour market careers. Moreover, stricter employment protection legislation makes it harder for 
employers to dismiss female workers after their return from maternity leave. If an employer feels 
that the leaǀe ǁas assoĐiated ǁith a depƌeĐiatioŶ of the ǁoƌkeƌ͛s joď skills, stƌiĐter dismissal 
protection may make it economically viable to invest in the retraining or upskilling of that worker 
rather than dismissing her. The neo-classical assumption that protective institutions are detrimental 
for female employment is based on the idea that women have discontinuous careers. However, the 
very existence of strict employment protection legislation may lead to more continuous female 
careers and prevent mothers from becoming labour market outsiders (see also Rubery, 2011: p. 
1114). In summary, a deregulation of EPL would be predicted to have positive implications for 
female employment outcomes from the neo-classical point of view, an alternative perspective 
emphasising the employment-maintaining effects of EPL would predict negative implications for 
female employment outcomes.  
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The implications of rigid employment legislation need to be understood in relation to the 
comparative rigidity of employment law for fixed-term or temporary contracts. Since the 1980s 
many European economies have deregulated their employment law, not by deregulating regular 
employment but by facilitating the generation of temporary work (sometimes also referred to as 
partial deregulation). This has been seen by many as introducing a dual labour market that divides 
secure permanent employees from a peripheralised temporary workforce (so-called flexibility at the 
margin, e.g. Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2000). In countries with strict EPL for permanent workers 
theƌe eǆists a stƌoŶg iŶĐeŶtiǀe foƌ eŵploǇeƌs to hiƌe ǁoƌkeƌs oŶ ﬁǆed-term instead of open-ended 
contracts (e.g. Pierre and Scarpetta, 2004). Previous research has confirmed that strict EPL increases 
the overall incidence of temporary employment (Booth et al., 2002a; Kahn, 2010). In countries 
where regular employment is only weakly regulated there are fewer incentives to hire workers on 
fixed-term contracts. The deregulation of temporary work should hence be less consequential in 
such contexts. If it is true that strict EPL leads to a disproportionate exclusion of female workers 
from permanent jobs (as asserted by neo-classical theory), a deregulation of fixed-term jobs should 
mainly affect women. If deregulation creates jobs for women who would otherwise be shut out of 
employment this could be a positive effect. However, if the use of temporary employment contracts 
increases at the expense of permanent employment (substitution effect) the deregulation of 
teŵpoƌaƌǇ ǁoƌk ǁould disadǀaŶtage ǁoŵeŶ͛s laďouƌ ŵaƌket positioŶ.  
 
Public Spending on Families  
 
While the theoretical discussions on the implications of protective labour market institutions for 
gendered inequality in labour market outcome focus on the employer rationale (i.e. the demand-
side perspective), the classical literature on gendered employment tends to focus on ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
choices (i.e., the supply-side perspective) in the context of traditional gender role ascriptions and 
inadequate public care infƌastƌuĐtuƌes ǁhiĐh ĐoŶstƌaiŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt optioŶs ǁheŶ theǇ 
have small children. It is well-established in the literature that institutional support to workers with 
care responsibilities has important repercussions for gendered labour market outcomes. Research 
has found important differences between the effects of the provision of cash benefits to carers (e.g. 
child allowances, income support during maternity and parental leave) and the provision of care 
services (Jaumotte, 2003; OECD, 2011). While the effect of family support in cash for female 
employment outcome is ambivalent, the public provision of affordable childcare services has 
uŶaŵďiguouslǇ ďeeŶ shoǁŶ to faĐilitate feŵale eŵploǇŵeŶt aŶd ǁoŵeŶ͛ ĐoŶtiŶuous Đaƌeeƌs ;see 
Steiber and Haas, 2012 for a review). Against this backdrop, we would predict state support to 
families in kind (covering the provision of childcare services) to have positive implications for female 
employment, supporting their capability to maintain continuous careers in regular employment and 
allowing them to work full-time (Connelly and Kimmel, 2003). This is based on the assumption that 
aŶ adeƋuate pƌoǀisioŶ of ĐhildĐaƌe iŶĐƌeases ǁoŵeŶ͛s optioŶs to folloǁ ĐoŶtiŶuous Đaƌeeƌs as 
labour market insiders. A focus on state support to families on cash benefits, by contrast, provides 
incentives for women to leave the labour market and to act as state subsidised home-carers and 
ŵaǇ thus iŶĐƌease ǁoŵeŶ͛s ƌisk of peƌipheƌalised eŵploǇŵeŶt aŶd laďouƌ ŵaƌket eǆĐlusioŶ.  
 
 
The Public Sector as Employer 
 
The welfare state structures female employment in two ways: in its provision of childcare and other 
financial support to families – as outlined above – and in its role as employer (Mandel and 
Semyonov, 2006). By providing working conditions which support women who want to combine paid 
work with child care responsibilities – e.g. flexible working hours, part-time work and high levels of 
employment protection – the public sector is an attractive employer for women. Accordingly, 
research has shown that public sector size explains a portion of cross-national differences in female 
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employment with large public sectors often associated with high female employment rates (e.g. 
Mandel and Semyonov, 2006). In countries with a laƌge puďliĐ seĐtoƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s ƌisk of being labour 
market outsiders is hence substantially lower. At the same time, the size of the public sector has 
been used to explain the ͚ǁelfaƌe state paƌadoǆ͛, where progressive (and large) welfare states that 
foster ǁoŵeŶ͛s employment are seen to simultaneously increase occupational gender segregation 
and limit female occupational attainment (e.g. Mandel and Semyonov, 2006). In other words, public 
sector employment tends to channel women into ͞feŵiŶiŶe oĐĐupatioŶal ŶiĐhes͟ ;iďid., p.1916) 
whilst also diverting them from lucrative, high-paying positions in the private sector. In line with this 
argument Yaish and Stier (2009) show that cross-national differences in the gender gap in job 
authority is higher in the public sector than the private sector. They also find support for the 
selection hypothesis, that women prefer public sector employment as it allows them to balance 
work with family responsibilities. This is an important finding as it underscores the role of the state 
in its provision of emploǇŵeŶt ͚shelteƌed͛ fƌoŵ ŵaƌket foƌĐes. IŶdeed the portion of the gender pay 
gap attributed to pay discrimination has been found to be smaller in the public sector than the 
private sector, with the public sector seen as able and willing to enforce equal pay legislation 
(Jurajada, 2003). 
While the problematic implications of the public sector for female occupational attainment 
are widely acknowledged, recent work also challenged the assumption that the public sector per se 
offers women higher levels of protection than the public sector. Ellenguth and Kohaut (2011) find 
little difference between the public and private sector in the extent to which temporary jobs are 
offered in Germany. Similarly, in the UK there is evidence that public sector workers on temporary 
contracts have lower transitions to permanent jobs than in the private sector (Booth et al., 2002b). 
In Spain, there is evidence of a sharper rise in temporary employment use in the public than the 
private sector (Dolado et al., 2002).  
Additionally, the relation between public sector size, industrial relations and employment 
conditions differs across countries. There is, for example, substantial variation across countries in 
the extent to which the public sector can be assumed to be more highly unionised: Waddington 
(2005: p. 6) finds considerable variation in the proportion of unionised workers in the public sector 
by country, ranging from 29-82 percent. That the public sector means different things in different 
countƌies is also eǀideŶĐed ďǇ MaŶdel aŶd “eŵǇoŶoǀ͛s ;ϮϬϬϲͿ fiŶdiŶg that the iŵpaĐt of ǁelfaƌe 
state poliĐies oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s teŶdeŶĐǇ to ǁoƌk paƌt-time is only observable when the analytic sample 
excludes the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, published data 
shows that some countries with the highest female employment rates in Europe (e.g. Portugal and 
the Czech Republic) have very low levels of public sector employment (OECD, 2009). So the implied 
relationship between public sector size and female employment rates can be inconsistent.  
In combination, these findings suggest that the public sector is a category which - while theoretically 
interesting - empirically appears to be a hold-all-category for different protective features of 
employment legislation and trade unionism, and one which has different meanings in different 
institutional contexts. For these substantive reasons, but also based on methodological grounds, 
which are explained in detail in the following section on Operationalisation, Data and Methods, the 
size of the public sector as such will not enter as a predictor in our empirical analyses. We do, 
however, control for the generosity of the welfare state supporting maternal employment through 
the provision of in kind services such as childcare (as discussed in the previous section). Finally, it is 
not too grandiose a claim to suggest that countries with high rates of spending on families also tend 
to have large welfare states. Indeed our indicator of spending on families correlates very highly with 
public sector size (r=0.87) using the latest available data from the OECD (2009). So while public 
sector size and spending on families are not quite the same thing, the empirical overlap is 
considerable.3 
                                                          
3
 We use the OECD ;ϮϬϬϵͿ iŶdiĐatoƌ ŵeasuƌiŶg ͞EŵploǇŵeŶt iŶ geŶeƌal goǀeƌŶŵeŶt as a peƌĐeŶtage of the 
laďouƌ foƌĐe͟ that is aǀailaďle foƌ the Ǉeaƌ ϮϬϬϱ foƌ ϭϱ of the ĐouŶtƌies aŶalǇsed iŶ the pƌeseŶt studǇ. This 
iŶdiĐatoƌ Đoƌƌelates ǁith the ͚iŶ kiŶd͛ faŵilǇ poliĐǇ iŶdiĐator described in the Appendix tables A1 and A2.   
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Operationalisation, Data and Methods 
Data and Sample 
 
The paper deploys repeat cross-sectional data from the EULFS. It covers 18 countries over a period 
of up to 16 years (1992-2007). Table A1 in the appendix provides full information on the sample. The 
EULFS is cross-nationally comparable, providing standardized individual-level labour market data. 
The EULFS has two central strengths: its considerable sample size, allowing an assessment of sub-
populations of interest, as well as the length of its time-series (cf. Eurostat 2005 for detail). The 
following countries are analysed: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, 
Sweden, and the UK. Since for Germany harmonized EULFS data only became available in 2002, we 
draw instead on the German Mikrozensus (GMZ) which provides for a longer time-series (1995-
2007). We do not include later years because the Great Recession that started in 2008 in most 
countries had very gender-specific employment effects that were to a great extent unrelated to the 
labour market institutions under study. Men were disadvantaged in terms of job loss because they 
tended to be concentrated in the hardest hit industrial sectors (see Arpaia and Curci, 2010). 
Employment declines within industrial sectors, however, were fairly equal for men and women (see 
e.g. Cho and Newhouse, 2013). Hence, including the peak recession years in our study would involve 
breaks in our time series of gendered labour market outcome that are unrelated to institutional 
change. Our EUFLS micro-data are complemented by high-quality time-series data on institutional 
change from the OECD, the World Economic Outlook (WEO) and the ICTWSS database (for details 
see Table A1 in the appendix).  
 We compare men and women in their early to mid-forties. Our analytic sample includes over 
2.5 million individuals aged 40-44 years nested within 18 countries. The focus on this particular age 
group has been motivated by the following: First, most women in this age group will have already re-
entered (or attempted to re-enter) the labour market after a potential childbearing-related 
employment interruption. At the same time, this is a life-cycle stage in which most women have 
non-adult children. Second, by analysing an age group unlikely to be on maternity leave we also 
deĐƌease the ƌisk of ŵisĐlassifǇiŶg Ŷeǁ ŵotheƌs͛ laďouƌ market status. This is important as cross-
ŶatioŶal ǀaƌiatioŶ iŶ ŵateƌŶitǇ leaǀe eŶtitleŵeŶt aŶd ďeŶefits ŵeaŶs that iŶ soŵe ĐouŶtƌies͛ EULF“ 
data women on maternity leave are classified as employed while in others they are classified as 
inactive. Finally, the focus on this specific age-group has the advantage that gender effects on 
employment outcomes can be studied that are not confounded by gender-specific age effects. In 
terms of labour ŵaƌket pƌospeĐts, ǁoŵeŶ aƌe ĐoŶsideƌed ͚old͛ eaƌlieƌ thaŶ ŵeŶ ďeĐause they tend 
to retire substantially earlier. They may in fact already suffer from age discrimination by age 45. 
  
Statistical Method and Variables  
 
Dynamic multilevel modelling 
 
We apply a dynamic multilevel modelling method to estimate the impact of institutional change on 
gendered labour market outcomes. The dynamic component derives from the fact that we use data 
from 18 countries that provide data for up to 16 years. Overall, we have data from 205 country-years 
(see Table A1 for the number of years contributed by each of the countries). Using these data, we 
follow a two-step multilevel modelling approach that uses estimated parameters obtained from 
individual-level regressions carried out for each country-year (step-1) as dependent variables in 
country-panel regressions (step-2). Our strategy, in more detail, is as follows: 
In step-1, we use the harmonised repeat cross-sectional micro data described above and run 
ŵultiŶoŵial logistiĐ ƌegƌessioŶ ŵodels of ǁoŵeŶ͛s aŶd ŵeŶ͛s labour market status (differentiating 
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between seven different statuses, see below for detail). These models are estimated separately for 
each of the 205 country-years, controlling for sex and education (differentiating three levels: lower 
secondary (ISCED 0-2; 3c if shorter than 2 years), upper secondary (ISCED 3-4) and tertiary (ISCED 5-
6)). On the basis of these 205 step-1 regressions we then estimate predicted probabilities for each of 
the seven categories of our dependent variable, separately for women and men, and pertaining to 
individuals with medium levels of education that represents the modal skill level of respondents. It is 
important to note that this step of the analysis is descriptive rather than explanatory. It applies very 
parsimonious models used to predict the distribution of male and female employment (at age 40-44 
and medium levels of education) across seven different labour market outcomes. Previous work has 
regularly drawn on published rates of employment and unemployment for similar purposes. Our 
analysis goes further insofar as we are able to focus on a very specific population group for which no 
official data is published. Moreover, estimating the shares of the population in different statuses 
ourselves using micro-data, we are able to provide a holistic and nuanced analysis of a broad range 
of labour market statuses . 
 In step-2, the 205 predicted probabilities for each category of our step-1 outcome variable 
are used as the dependent variables in country-panel regressions, using a fixed effects approach. 
Our central explanatory variables in these step-2 regressions are time-varying country-level 
covariates that measure the level of employment protection of permanent jobs, the regulation of 
temporary work, union strength (collective bargaining coverage), and public spending on families 
(distinguishing between cash and in kind). Each model also contains controls for GDP per capita, and 
annual change of GDP per capita, as well as skill supply (cf. Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix for full 
details on these variables). Since some of our macro-variables show correlations of medium strength 
(e.g. family benefits, GDP and skill supply; cf. Table A3 in the appendix), we ran some sensitivity tests 
on our models, which suggested that the correlations were unproblematic to the results presented 
here. In order to account for the temporal order of labour market developments and policy change 
we lag our institutional and macro-economic variables by two years (a strategy recommended by 
Mourre, 2006). Through the inclusion of time dummies (creating year-specific intercepts) we capture 
developments over time common to all countries (e.g. economic shocks that occur in the same year 
for all countries). Through the inclusion of dummy variables for each country, we estimate country 
fixed effects models (FE) that control for all unobserved factors at the country-level that are time-
invariant (e.g. stable institutional differences). The central advantage of using a fixed-effects 
approach is that we are able to largely circumvent endogeneity problems inherent in cross-sectional 
comparative work (see also Gebel and Giesecke, 2011). Another implication of our strategy is that 
our results from this dynamic multilevel modelling can be interpreted as estimates of the effect of 
changes in the institutional context on employment outcomes.  
In step-2 of the analysis the error term is composed of the error associated with the fact that 
the dependent variable is estimated (from regressions at step-1) rather than observed, and of the 
habitual residual variance from the model (see Lewis and Linzer, 2005; Hanushek, 1974). Due to 
varying precision with which predicted probabilities are estimated we apply weights to step-2 
ƌegƌessioŶs. We folloǁ Leǁis aŶd LiŶzeƌ͛s appƌoaĐh (2005: pp. 351), which assigns greater weight to 
more precisely estimated predicted probabilities.  
Under certain conditions the two-step approach is considered superior to standard 
multilevel models that estimate both steps of the analysis simultaneously (see special issue in 
Political Analysis 2005, Volume 13). It is considered ideal for data which have a large N of level-1 
observations but only a small N of level-2 units (ibid.; see also discussion by Heisig, 2011), as is the 
case with our data (we look at over 2.5 million level-1 observations nested in 18 countries). 
Additionally, the two-step approach is more flexible in terms of the specification of individual-level 
associations (simultaneous multilevel models require the majority of level-1 effects to be specified 
as fixed, i.e. as equivalent across countries). In this way, account can be taken of a greater number of 
cross-level interactions without facing convergence problems (Primo et al., 2007). For these reasons 
two-step models have become increasingly popular in sociological work with a cross-nationally 
  
Page 10 
 
  
comparative perspective (e.g. Gebel and Giesecke, 2011; Heisig, 2011) and are now considered state 
of the art by many. 
 
A comprehensive analysis of employment outcomes 
 
In our step-1 regressions we distinguish five employment outcomes (permanent full-time 
employment, permanent part-time employment, temporary work, marginal employment, and self-
employment) and two non-employment outcomes (unemployment, inactivity). Those who have 
been working at least one hour in the reference week, or who have a job from which they are 
temporarily absent count as employed. Permanent employees are those holding a work contract of 
unlimited duration, while those with contracts of limited duration count as temporary workers. We 
classify full-time workers as those working at least 30 hours a week. Part-time workers are those 
who work between 15 and 29 hours a week. Respondents who work less than 15 hours, or who are 
family workers, fall into the marginal work category (irrespective of contract type). All non-employed 
individuals who have been seeking employment in the past four weeks and are available for work 
are categorized as unemployed. Those who are not actively seeking employment because they have 
alƌeadǇ fouŶd a joď aƌe also iŶĐluded iŶ the ͚uŶeŵploǇed͛ ĐategoƌǇ. All non-employed respondents 
to whom these criteria do not apply are considered to be economically inactive (e.g. discouraged 
workers, ill or disabled persons).  
Our outcome variable examines the full range of potential labour market statuses. Since the 
entire sample population is covered by one of the seven labour market outcomes, a positive effect 
of institutional change on one outcome necessarily implies a negative effect on one of the other 
outcomes. This thus affords us with an understanding of labour market dynamics following 
institutional change. If institutional change is found to increase part-time employment, for example, 
we can see whether it does so at the expense of full-time employment (a potentially negative 
outcome) or by lowering the rate of unemployment (a positive outcome). Analysing a very wide set 
of possible labour market outcomes is an important asset of our analytic strategy. Evidently, even 
this nuanced approach of distinguishing employment outcomes of different quality (based on the 
assumption that permanent full-time employment is of greater comparative worth than part-time 
employment or temporary work) is at risk of grouping heterogeneous outcomes. One obvious 
example - given the focus of this paper on gender inequality in the labour market - is part-time work. 
While part-time employment is often praised as facilitating the combination of paid work and care 
responsibilities, it is associated with inferior status jobs with low opportunities for promotion and 
skill development and lower hourly pay. While some, so called ͚ƌeteŶtioŶ paƌt-tiŵe joďs͛ aƌe of good 
quality, often offered to high skilled women who are some of the few in a position to negotiate 
reduced hours whilst retaining their post (Gash et al., 2012), the majority of part-time work in 
Euƌope is still assoĐiated ǁith ͞iŶ loǁ-paid, low status-joďs͟ ;Kalleďeƌg, ϮϬϬϬͿ. This heteƌogeŶeitǇ iŶ 
part-time jobs has been the focus of much debate (e.g. Tilly, 1996). With the data at hand it is not 
possible to fully account for the heterogeneity in part-time jobs. While the EULFS would have 
provided us with the opportunity to differentiate between voluntary and involuntary part-time 
ǁoƌk, this distiŶĐtioŶ ǁould Ŷot ďe ǀeƌǇ useful to diffeƌeŶtiate ďetǁeeŶ ͞good͟ aŶd ͞ďad͟ paƌt-time 
work, because the overwhelming majority of part-timers claim to work part-time voluntarily. For 
instance, in 2007, the last year we observe in our time series, only 17 percent of all female EU part-
timers were involuntary part-timers (OECD, 2014). While we are thus not able to effectively 
diffeƌeŶtiate ďetǁeeŶ ͞good͟ aŶd ͞ďad͟ paƌt-time jobs, our operationalization entails that our part-
time category does not contain any obviously precarious arrangements as we include those on 
permanent contracts only. This is an important distinction also in light of findings by Gash and Inanc 
(2013), which suggest that contract type may be a more important predictor of job quality than 
working time. Further differentiation could have included a distinction between part-time and full-
time fixed-term employment and voluntary and involuntary inactivity. We believe, however, that 
any further differentiation would have come at the price of coherence and readability. The very 
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detailed account we offer is already a rarity in current labour market research. Furthermore, a 
distinction of fixed-term workers by part-time would have ďeeŶ a Đase of ͚splittiŶg haiƌs͛ foƌ ŵost 
countries, with too few cases to warrant analysis especially when it comes to male temporary part-
time workers. 
 
Interactive model of regulation and protection 
 
In our step-2 country-panel models, we account for the fact that the effect of institutional change is 
likely to be context-dependent. As outlined in the theory section, we expect the deregulation of 
temporary work to have different implications in contexts where employment protection for 
standard contracts is strict compared to contexts where it is loose. It was also predicted that 
changes in collective bargaining coverage will be mediated by the level of coordination of the wage-
setting system. In order to account for such context-dependencies, we estimate interaction effects 
to test how the effect of deregulation of temporary work varies between high and low employment 
protection contexts and how the effect of collective bargaining coverage varies between low, 
medium and high coordination contexts. The variables accounting for context are measured as time-
constant. So while our main effect for employment protection legislation is measured in a time-
varying manner (measured on a scale from 0-6), when we test how the effect of deregulation of 
temporary work varies across high and low EPL contexts, a time-constant dichotomous measure is 
used (with low EPL referring to values below 2.17) . This was possible, because despite the change 
over time in our EPL indicator, countries did stay within the same category (high/low) throughout 
the entire observation period. The time-constant variable measuring coordination follows a similar 
logic (please see Table A2 for more detail). To facilitate the interpretation of these interactions, the 
coefficients are already presented as the sum of main and interaction effects. This means, for 
example, that coefficients presented for CBC can be directly interpreted as the effect of increased 
coverage in the respective coordination context.  
 
Exclusion of the Public Sector 
As noted earlier, previous work has sought to measure the effect of public sector size on gender 
differences in employment as well as in occupational attainment. As discussed in our theory section, 
we have a number of substantive reasons for not including sector as a predictor in our analyses. 
Aside from these there are also methodological and data-related reasons for not doing so. First of 
all, public sector would present a weak predictor in dynamic models of employment outcome, due 
to its high degree of stability over time (see OECD 2009 for evidence of lack of change over the 
period 1995-2005 in the share of public employment as a percentage of the labour force). Second, 
and even more importantly, the indicator of the size of the public sector is not available for all 
countries in our analyses and it is certainly not available for the long time-series that we analyse. For 
this reason, it is not possible – even if we had wanted – to include the change in public sector size in 
our analyses. At least we do not include change in the public sector measured as proportion of the 
labour force working for the government. We do include, however, change in welfare state 
generosity – both in kind and in cash – for families in our models.  
 
 
Results 
Time Trends in Gender Inequality in Labour Market Participation 
Figure 1 presents the descriptive step-1 estimates. These figures show that in almost all countries 
under study notable gender differences in forms of employment outcome exist. They reveal 
substantial cross-national variance in the extent of these differences but also in the time trends 
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therein. We find strong and persisting gender differences in standard employment rates. The 
countries showing the largest gender gap in full-time employment rates are Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK. Some countries also show a narrowing in the 
gender gap in standard employment, with Sweden, Denmark and Norway showing some positive 
gains for women. The findings for part-time permanent employment, which despite its permanent 
status is typically associated with inferior conditions, are mixed. There is considerable cross-national 
variation in part-time rates. Some countries, the Netherlands most notably, have an extremely high 
part-time employment rate while in other countries part-time employment rates are low (e.g. the 
Central and Eastern European countries, Portugal and Finland). In those countries, where part-time 
work is wide-spread, the gender gap in part-time work tends to be very large. Most crucially for our 
analyses there are considerable differences in trends overtime. The UK, Norway and Germany have 
very high and stable part-time rates, while others show rising rates of female part-time employment 
(Austria, Belgium the Netherlands, and to some extent Italy) and in some countries part-time 
employment is declining (Denmark and Sweden). It would appear vital to learn if institutional change 
is behind these trends and to understand the mechanisms behind the generation/or suppression of 
a part-time employment sector. Temporary employment and marginal employment while consisting 
of smaller shares of total employment again are disproportionately populated by women. Labour 
ŵaƌket ͚iŶaĐtiǀitǇ͛ is again clearly gendered. In some countries, however, the gender gap is quite 
small (in the Nordic and the CEE countries) and there is also clear evidence that it is declining as a 
labour market category in many countries. The review of these gender differences in labour market 
status overtime confirms the relevance of a research strategy which seeks to establish the 
mechanisms behind the observed changes. Which macro-economic structures, if any, support 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s iŶtegƌatioŶ to the staŶdaƌd eŵploǇŵeŶt ĐoŶtƌaĐt? 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Institutional change and its effect: Macro-Level Regressions 
The purpose of our step-2 analyses is to test whether institutional changes have affected the 
observed trends and thereby to understand the institutional mechanisms which serve to integrate or 
segƌegate ǁoŵeŶ͛s laďouƌ ŵaƌket eǆpeƌieŶĐe. As noted before, our step-2 regressions (though 
independently estimated) relate to each other, because the predicted employment outcomes that 
serve as the dependent variables sum up to 1 (or a hundred percent). Moving across the columns of 
Table 1, the regression coefficients therefore sum up to zero. This affords us with a detailed 
understanding of labour market dynamics. It allows us to observe what a development in one 
outcome is actually driven by: if we find, for example, that rising collective bargaining coverage (CBC) 
leads to a reduction in female inactivity, we can determine whether this is accompanied by an 
increase in permanent full-time or part-time employment or by an increase in marginal or fixed-term 
employment. Such an analytical perspective allows us to engage directly with research that has 
sought to examine the quality of the labour market experience (covering issues of female labour 
market segregation) rather than a simple assessment of participation rates. Before discussing our 
substantive results, it is worth briefly noting that the country fixed effects were highly significant in 
all models, while the time effects were insignificant. The significance of country effects on 
employment outcomes is not surprising given the amount of cross-national variation shown in Figure 
1. Their inclusion in the models ensures that all differences between countries that are time-
constant (such as stable institutional differences) are controlled for, so that any remaining effects 
pertain to change over time. The non-significance of our time-dummies indicate that during the time 
period under observation there were no economic (or other) shocks common to all countries 
studied. The coefficients of our control variables are not presented here, but are available upon 
request. 
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Employment protection legislation 
In our sample of countries declines in the strictness of EPL were more common than 
increases. Spain, where the EPL indicator has changed from 3.9 to 2.5 throughout our observation 
period (see Table A1 in the appendix), exhibits the greatest declines in EPL. Also note that we 
observe substantive reductions only in countries with high levels of EPL (cf. Table A1). Our findings 
are hence driven by countries which reduced the strictness of EPL from a high starting point.      
Our results shown in Table 1 indicate that increasing levels of employment protection would 
have had a positive effect on male employment outcomes: a one-unit increase in our EPL variable 
(measured on a scale from 0-6, with 6 denoting strict protection of employment on regular 
contracts) would raise ŵeŶ͛s pƌoďaďilitǇ of peƌŵaŶeŶt full-time employment by about 3.6 
percentage points, while reducing the rate of temporary and self-employment by around 1.9 and 2.3 
peƌĐeŶtage poiŶts, ƌespeĐtiǀelǇ. At the saŵe tiŵe, ŵeŶ͛s ƌisk of uŶeŵploǇŵeŶt ǁould increase by 1 
percentage point, but this effect is only marginally significant. Male self-employment also plays a 
central role in the employment dynamics we observe. In line with the literature, we observe that an 
increase in the strictness of EPL would curb self-employment (e.g. Robson, 2003). That enhancing 
the strictness of EPL would reduce the rate of self-employment may be seen as a positive effect in 
light of recent work that distinguishes between two types of self-eŵploǇŵeŶt: ͚iŶdepeŶdeŶt self-
eŵploǇŵeŶt͛ ;fƌeelǇ ĐhoseŶͿ aŶd ͚depeŶdeŶt self-eŵploǇŵeŶt͛ ;aŶ eŶfoƌĐed ƌe-classification of 
former employees as self-employed contractors). Román et al. (2011) suggest that stricter EPL tends 
to suppress the precarious forms of quasi self-employment predominantly used by employers to 
reduce non-wage labour costs. While we are not able to distinguish between dependent (or quasi) 
self-employment, the literature suggests that a substantial share of reported self-employment is 
dependent self-employment that is considered precarious with high flows from and to 
unemployment (Taylor, 2011). Against this backdrop, we consider permanent full-time employment 
to be preferable to self-employment. Another central finding was that increasing the strictness of 
EPL would significantly decrease temporary employment. The literature consistently reveals the 
inferior worth of temporary employment relative to regular employment (e.g. Mertens and 
McGinnity, 2004; Giesecke and Groß, 2003). In sum then the trend of deregulation of EPL that has 
taken place in some of the countries we observe appears to be  detrimental for men͛s laďouƌ ŵaƌket 
outcomes.  
WoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt outĐoŵes aƌe also affeĐted ďǇ EPL, alďeit less ŵaƌkedlǇ. We fiŶd that 
an increase in the strictness of EPL would have reduced their risk of holding a temporary contract (by 
1.5 percentage points) and would have also reduced their employment in permanent part-time jobs 
(though this effect is only marginally significant). Thus, while we find some evidence that an increase 
in the strictness of EPL would have reduced female employment, the results do not suggest a 
substantial negative effect as the neo-classical perspective predicts. Most importantly, we find no 
evidence that stricter EPL would impact the rate of regular employment for women. However, we 
also do not find statistical evidence of the beneficial employment effects of stricter EPL for women 
as predicted by our counter-hypothesis.  
In sum, the trend of EPL deregulation captured by our data may indeed help to alleviate 
gender inequality in outcome. This effect, however is driven by the negative implications for male 
permanent employment rather than by substantially improving employment outcomes for women.   
 
[Table 1 about here] 
Deregulation of temporary work 
Temporary work has been deregulated over the observation period in the majority of the countries 
under investigation (see Table A1). As one would expect this trend has occurred somewhat more 
frequently in countries where standard contracts are highly protected. Nevertheless, deregulation of 
temporary work also played a central role in countries with low levels of EPL. Italy, for example, is a 
country with low levels of EPL, but has experienced the most severe deregulation of temporary work 
in our whole sample: from 5.4 to 1.9 (see Table A1). 
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Our evidence from the country panel regressions suggests that such deregulation has similar 
implications for male labour market outcomes in high and low EPL contexts: the deregulation of 
temporary work ƌeduĐes ŵeŶ͛s pƌoďaďilitǇ of eŵploǇŵeŶt oŶ a full-time permanent contract, while 
increasing their risk of unemployment and especially self-employment. Regarding women, our 
results establish a strong interaction effect between the deregulation of temporary work and the 
degree to which regular permanent employment is protected. In institutional contexts where regular 
contracts are highly protected, the deregulation of temporary work leads to a substantial decline in 
female inactivity rates, while permanent part-time work (marginally significant), marginal part-time 
work and self-employment increase. In low EPL contexts, by contrast, the effects are unequivocally 
Ŷegatiǀe: ǁoŵeŶ͛s pƌoďaďilitǇ of full-time permanent employment is substantially decreased (with a 
shift to marginal part-time work and self-employment).  
In sum, we find little evidence for the assertion that it is mainly women who are (adversely) 
affected by the deregulation of temporary contracts. To the contrary, in contexts of strict EPL, the 
deregulation of temporary work appears to boost employment levels (permanent part-time work, 
marginal part-time work and self-employment). For men, by contrast, deregulation of temporary 
work has unequivocally negative implications irrespective of EPL environment. Moreover, our results 
reveal that – at least for our sample of mid-aged individuals – the partial deregulation hypothesis in 
general receives little support: there is no evidence that the deregulation of temporary work is more 
consequential when the regulation of permanent contracts is rigid. Furthermore, and relatedly, it is 
striking that the deregulation of temporary work has no implications for the volume of temporary 
work in mid-life. Note, though, that existent work concerned with young workers aged below 30 
years has provided evidence in favour of the partial deregulation hypothesis (e.g. Dieckhoff and 
Steiber, 2012). 
 
Collective bargaining coverage  
We observe a mixed time trend in collective bargaining coverage. Five of the countries under 
observation experienced a major change in collective bargaining coverage amounting to at least ten 
percentage points, of these four experienced a decline. Notably, three out of these four dramatic 
declines occurred in countries which already had low levels of collective bargaining coverage at the 
beginning of our observation window. The one dramatic increase occurred in Denmark which 
already had high levels of collective bargaining coverage at the outset. A substantial change of at 
least five (but less than 10) percentage points was experienced by four countries in our sample, out 
of these three experienced an increase. All of these changes took place in countries with already 
high levels of collective bargaining at the outset.  
Our results on the impact of collective bargaining coverage (CBC) contradict the neo-classical 
expectation that influential trade unions have negative employment effects for women. Instead, we 
find that an increase in CBC leads to positive employment effects for both men and women. Its 
effect depends very much on the level of coordination, however.  
For men, we observe positive employment outcomes as a consequence of increased CBC for 
both medium and high coordination contexts. At medium coordination levels (e.g. found in 
Denmark, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) a one unit increase in CBC (which pertains to a 10 percentage 
point increase in CBCͿ ǁould ďoost ŵeŶ͛s pƌoďaďilitǇ of full-time permanent employment by almost 
5 percentage points, while reducing their unemployment risk by almost 2 percentage points (though 
this latter effect is only marginally significant). At high levels of coordination, increased CBC also 
leads to a notable growth of the standard employment contract (by about 4 percentage points) and 
does so while reducing self-employment by a similar extent. In low coordination contexts increased 
CBC ƌaises ŵeŶ͛s uŶeŵploǇŵeŶt pƌoďaďilitǇ, however.  
For women, positive effects are most clearly observed for medium levels of coordination. In 
such a context a 10 percentage point increase in CBC ǁould augŵeŶt ǁoŵeŶ͛s pƌoďaďilitǇ of full-
time permanent employment by 7.1 percentage points at the expense of unemployment, 
permanent part-time work, and marginal part-time employment (these are reduced by 2.8, 5.5, and 
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1.3 percentage points, respectively). Our models would hence predict negative trends in female 
employment outcome for a country like Portugal which has medium levels of coordination and 
experienced a reduction in its CBC by 10 percentage points (see Table A1 in the appendix for 
overview). In low and high coordination contexts increased CBC levels reduce inactivity. In high 
coordination contexts, our coefficient also suggests a positive effect of CBC on full-time permanent 
employment for women, but the effect is notably smaller compared to medium coordination 
contexts and fails to reach statistical significance. 
In sum, our findings provide no evidence in support of the neo-classical perspective. 
Increased union power, measured here as growth in CBC, does not appear to price women out of 
(permanent) employment. Instead, increases in union strength are shown to have beneficial effects 
oŶ ŵeŶ͛s aŶd ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood of ďeiŶg eŵploǇed oŶ a peƌŵaŶeŶt aŶd full-time employment 
contract. Notably, there is no indication that the employment outcomes of increased CBC are more 
positive in high coordination contexts than in medium coordination contexts. We hence find no clear 
suppoƌt foƌ the politiĐal eĐoŶoŵǇ peƌspeĐtiǀe ƌegaƌdiŶg the ƌole of ĐooƌdiŶatioŶ, oƌ foƌ the ͚huŵp-
shape͛ hǇpothesis. What is iŵpoƌtant to note, though, is that irrespective of the coordination 
context CBC growth has no negative employment outcomes for women. 
 
Public Spending on Families 
Most countries under investigation have increased the level of public spending on families in the 
period under observation (see Table A1 in the appendix for overview) both in terms of in kind 
services and cash benefits. In some countries the change is quite remarkable. The UK, the 
Netherlands and Belgium have made quite dramatic changes in expenditure in services in kind. Our 
analysis reveals a significant impact of public expenditure in kind, covering childcare services 
predominantly, oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s laďouƌ ŵaƌket status. We observe clear positive employment effects. 
Increased public spending on in kind familǇ suppoƌt ƌaises ǁoŵeŶ͛s permanent part-time 
employment whilst reducing unemployment and marginal part-time work. This is in line with our 
prediction that state support to families in kind should have positive effects on female employment 
outcomes. Turning to public spending in the form of cash benefits (income support or benefits paid 
directly to families), we find women to be negatively affected. We observe an increase in their 
unemployment risk while their temporary employment is reduced. These results provide support to 
the argument that cash benefits can have detrimental outcomes for women, while in kind 
eǆpeŶdituƌe oŶ faŵilies is ĐoŶduĐiǀe to positiǀe eŵploǇŵeŶt outĐoŵes. “iŶĐe ŵeŶ͛s laďouƌ supply is 
comparatively unaffected by care responsibilities, we would expect fewer effects of state support to 
families on their employment outcomes. Our results confirm this expectation in terms of in kind 
support to families. They also suggest, however, that increasing levels of cash support to families 
ƌeduĐe ŵeŶ͛s likelihood of ďeiŶg self-employed or in temporary work. The latter effects are rather 
small and may be spurious, i.e. being driven by other dimensions of institutional change that 
correlate with rising levels of cash support to families.   
 
Conclusion and Outlook  
 
The aim of this paper has been to empirically test the impact of labour market institutions on gender 
inequality in labour market outcome. We examined whether employment regulation and protection, 
union strength, and wage-setting coordination drive inequality dynamics amongst the mid-aged and 
medium educated male and female workforce (focusing on women and men aged 40-44 years). 
These labour market institutions are generally theorised to shape gendered inequality in Iabour 
market outcome through their effect on labour demand rationales. Accounting also for institutions 
that affect labour supply, we furthermore considered the implications of family policies. We have 
run country-panel regressions based on data from 18 European countries spanning the period from 
1992-2007 and provide important insights into the labour market dynamics of institutional change. 
Our use of time-series data and fixed-effects modelling brings us closer to making causal claims 
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regarding institutional effects than most of the existing work in this area. The institutional effects we 
estaďlish aƌe aǀeƌages, hoǁeǀeƌ. We haǀe to ďe aǁaƌe that theƌe ŵaǇ ďe diffeƌeŶĐes iŶ ͚geŶdeƌ 
ƌelatioŶs͛ aŶd ͚geŶdeƌ ƌegiŵes͛ ďetǁeeŶ soĐieties, aŶd that, theƌefoƌe, iŶstitutioŶs aŶd iŶstitutioŶal 
change will not always operate in comparable ways across countries (see Rubery, 2011: p. 1107). 
Nevertheless, we believe that our analytical strategy has afforded us with important insights into the 
labour market dynamics of institutional change and their implications for gendered outcome.  
Our findings provide little support for the neo-classical claim that labour market 
deregulation will increase gender equality in employment chances. The closest we came to 
confirming such claims was the result that men benefitted more clearly from stricter employment 
protection than women. For women, no positive effects of tightening employment protection were 
found, but neither could any strong negative effects be discerned (in terms of reduced permanent 
employment or increased inactivity or unemployment). So, we do find some evidence that a 
deregulation of EPL could mitigate gender inequality in access to regular employment. However, the 
potential of EPL-deregulation to reduce gender inequality is driven predominantly by the negative 
effects for men, ďut ĐƌuĐiallǇ Ŷot ďǇ ŵeĐhaŶisŵs that iŶĐƌease ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to the staŶdaƌd 
employment contract. 
Regarding the deregulation of temporary contracts we found no indication that women 
would be more adversely affected than men. To the contrary, our results for women suggest that 
the detrimental effect in terms of reduced employment on permanent full-time contracts is limited 
to national contexts where regular employment protection is low. Men experience unequivocally 
negative employment effects of deregulation independent of how strongly regular employment is 
protected. Our findings hence provided no support for the hypothesis that women – as labour 
market outsiders – would be disproportionally affected by the deregulation of temporary work. 
The finding of this study which most strongly challenged neo-classical theoretical accounts 
pertained to the effect of unionisation. We found no indication that increases in union strength 
would crowd women out of employment. Instead our results indicate that women can benefit 
substantially from increased collective bargaining coverage. Specifically, in contexts with medium 
leǀels of ĐooƌdiŶatioŶ iŶĐƌeased ĐolleĐtiǀe ďaƌgaiŶiŶg Đoǀeƌage ďoosts ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt oŶ 
standard contracts while decreasing their risk of unemployment and marginal employment. 
Increases in union strength also proved to exert positive employment outcomes for men. There was 
no indication, however, that they benefitted more than their female counterparts. Our results hence 
provide no suppoƌt foƌ the hǇpothesis that uŶioŶs pƌoteĐt ŵale ǁoƌkeƌs͛ iŶteƌests at the eǆpeŶse of 
women. 
Finally, we found that family policies have strong implications for gender inequalities in 
employment outcome. Increased state support to families in kind (i.e. childcare infrastructure) 
sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ iŶĐƌeases ǁoŵeŶ͛s peƌŵaŶeŶt paƌt-time employment rate while simultaneously 
reducing their risk of unemployment and marginal employment. To put it another way, in countries 
with decreasing rates of expenditure in childcare women who would have been in permanent part-
time employment would find themselves moving into unemployment or marginal employment. In 
order for in kind policies to narrow the existing gender inequalities in employment, they would also 
Ŷeed to faĐilitate ǁoŵeŶ͛s full-time employment, however. An interesting avenue for future 
research would be to establish under which conditions and in which institutional contexts increased 
speŶdiŶg oŶ ĐhildĐaƌe positiǀelǇ affeĐts ǁoŵeŶ͛s aďilitǇ to eŶteƌ full-time employment.  
In sum, our analyses have shown that gender inequality in employment outcome is 
substantially affected by institutional change. We found no support for the neo-classical theory, that 
deregulation could increase gender equality in employment outcomes. Rather, we found that 
stronger uŶioŶs ĐaŶ help ƌaise ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐhaŶĐes of eŵploǇŵeŶt oŶ the staŶdaƌd eŵploǇŵeŶt 
contract. Finally, while our ŵaiŶ atteŶtioŶ ǁas oŶ ͚ĐlassiĐal͛ laďouƌ ŵaƌket outĐoŵes, ǁe oďseƌǀed 
that self-employment (especially for men) and marginal work (especially for women) played a 
relevant role in the employment dynamics triggered by institutional change. Given that these types 
of labour market outcome have central implications for labour market inequality this again 
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underscores the value of our research strategy that accounts for the full range of possible outcomes 
to understand the employment dynamics of institutional change. Our research strategy of examining 
such a comprehensive set of outcomes has meant, however, that we were not able to examine how 
the effects of institutional change on female employment outcomes vary for low-and high-skilled 
women. This would be an interesting avenue for future work in this field. 
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Figure 1: Step-1 estimates of predicted probabilities for seven labour market outcomes 
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Figure 1 (continued) 
  
 
 
 
 
Notes: The figures show predicted probabilities of 7 different 
labour market outcomes separately for women and men. The 
sum of the predicted probabilities across all outcomes sum up to 
100% in each of the countries and survey waves 1992-2007. 
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Table 1: Institutional Change and Labour Market Outcomes, Fixed-Effects Estimates (EDV), women and men aged 40-44 years 
 
Permanent 
Full-time 
Permanent 
Part-time  
Temporary 
 
Unemployed 
 
Inactive 
 
Self-Employed 
Marginal Part-
time  
MEN 
Protection of regular contracts (EPL) (a) 3.58** -0.19 -1.88*** 1.04+ -0.55 -2.34** 0.34*** 
Deregulation of temporary work (b) 
High EPL   -1.97** -0.01 0.12 0.70+ -0.26 1.27* 0.16* 
Low EPL  -1.59*** 0.00 -0.12 0.37* 0.24 1.17*** -0.05 
Collective bargaining coverage  
(CBC in 10%) (c) 
Low COORD  -1.39 -0.20+ 0.16 1.41* -0.36 0.20 0.19+ 
Medium COORD 4.90** 0.31 -0.60 -1.87+ -0.72 -1.72 -0.29 
High COORD 4.21* 0.08 -0.06 0.79 -0.68 -4.14** -0.20 
Public spending on families  
(in 100 $ p.c.)    
Cash 0.59 0.26** -0.46** 0.35 0.17 -0.84* -0.07 
In kind 0.54 -0.13 0.24 -0.01 -0.39 -0.29 0.04 
WOMEN 
Protection of regular contracts (EPL) (a) 1.80 -2.30+ -1.51** 0.91 1.02 0.16 -0.08 
Deregulation of temporary work (b) 
High EPL   -0.33 1.44+ -0.40 0.21 -2.74** 0.64* 1.17** 
Low EPL  -1.52** 0.25 0.23 -0.01 0.15 0.50* 0.39* 
Collective bargaining coverage  
(CBC in 10%) (c) 
Low COORD  -0.09 -0.11 0.50 1.06 -2.24* 0.43 0.44 
Medium COORD 7.06** -5.47* 0.49 -2.77** 2.20 -0.20 -1.32* 
High COORD 2.47 -0.86 0.68 0.04 -2.92+ 0.44 0.16 
Public spending on families  
(in 100 $ p.c.)    
Cash 0.69 0.24 -0.62* 0.74** -0.83 0.08 -0.29 
In kind 0.33 1.84* -0.16 -0.77* -0.43 -0.19 -0.62** 
Notes: Summary of results from separate fixed effects (FE) regressions for 7 dependent variables (predicted labour force status, measured in % of population in permanent full-time work, 
permanent part-time work, temporary work, unemployment, inactivity, self-employment and marginal part-time work, refer to Figure 1 for an overview). For each of our level 2 regressions 
we have a sample of N=205 cases (i.e. for each of our seven outcomes we have 205 predicted probabilities that vary by country and time, for number of country-years contributed by each 
country see Table A1). All of the macro-variable predictors are lagged by two years (Tables A1 and A2 for detail on predictor and control variables). The level 2 regressions also control for: 
GDP per capita, growth in GDP per capita, skill supply, year dummies and country dummies, though these variables are not shown in the table above (Tables A1 and A2 for detail, full 
estimation results are available from the authors upon request). All estimates are based on FE regression models that are corrected for potential bias from estimated dependent variables 
(EDV) following Lewis and Linzer (2005). (a) EPL measured as a continuous variable, controlled for levels of deregulation; (b) the effects of deregulation for the high and low EPL contexts are 
estimated by two regressions: deregulation of temporary work once interacted with a time invariant dummy in which 1=high EPL and once interacted with the inverse of the dummy in which 
1=low EPL. (c) The degree of CBC is interacted with three different sets of dummies representing the degree of wage coordination measured by three time-invariant categories (high, medium, 
low).  
*** p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05 +p<.10  
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Overview of time-series coverage and macro-level variables, by country 
 
Years included (a) Macros: values at start and end of country-specific observation window (b) 
  
GDP p.c. 
in $1000 
GDP change 
in % 
Skill supply 
in % 
Public spending 
on families 
Labour market regulation 
(c) 
CBC  
in % 
COORD 
(time invariant) 
EPL 
(time invariant) 
in kind in cash  EPL TEMP 
Austria 1995-2007 (#13) 21.1-33.9 0.4-2.5 69-80 91-159 557-809 2.9-2.4 1.5-1.5 99-99 high high 
Belgium 1992-2007 (#16) 17.9-32.0 3.1-2.2 50-68 22-303 401-531 1.7-1.7 4.6-2.6 96-96 high low 
Czech Rep. 1999, 2003, 2006, 2007 (#4) 13.7-20.3 -0.7-6.3 86-91 18-115 229-237 3.3-3.3 0.5-0.9 55-44 low high 
Denmark 1992-2007 (#16) 18.6-33.5 1.6-2.4 74-76 341-614 261-519 1.7-1.6 3.1-1.4 69-82 medium low 
Finland 1995-2007 (#13) 16.2-30.4 -0.9-2.8 67-81 246-418 428-487 2.5-2.2 1.9-1.9 82-90 high high 
France 1993-2007 (#15) 18.9-30.5 1.0-1.9 56-69 187-482 263-412 2.3-2.5 3.6-3.6 93-95 low high 
Germany  1995-2007 (#13) 20.4-30.5 -0.8-0.7 81-84 162-224 262-436 2.7-3.0 3.8-1.3 70-63 high high 
Greece 1992-2000, 2005-2007 (#12) 13.0-25.4 0.0-2.9 37-60 37-99 48-177 2.3-2.3 4.8-3.1 80-85 high high 
Hungary 2003, 2005-2007 (#4)  12.9-16.9 4.1-4.0 74-79 149-208 249-321 1.9-1.9 0.6-1.1 34-35 low low 
Italy 1992-2007 (#16) 17.1-28.1 2.1-0.7 33-52 27-202 107-161 1.8-1.8 5.4-1.9 83-80 high low 
Netherlands 1996-2007 (#12) 22.1-35.0 2.9-2.0 63-73 70-351 210-222 3.1-3.1 2.4-1.2 85-82 high high 
Norway 1996-2007 (#12) 29.2-47.5 5.1-2.7 81-79 293-598 518-752 2.3-2.3 3.5-2.9 72-72 high high 
Poland 2001, 2003, 2005 (#3) 9.6-11.7 4.5-3.9 80-85 21-29 86-107 2.1-2.1 0.8-1.3 43-40 low low 
Portugal 1992, 1996, 2004-2005 (#4) 11.0-18.8 7.9- -0.8 20-27 10-151 67-129 4.8-4.3 3.4-3.0 79-69 medium high 
Slovakia 2000-2007 (#8) 10.7-16.0 4.4-6.5 84-89 8-64 207-273 2.5-2.3 1.1-0.4 48-36 high high 
Spain 1992-2007 (#16) 14.2-27.3 3.8-3.6 24-50 11-189 32-122 3.9-2.5 3.8-3.5 76-81 medium high 
Sweden 1995-2007 (#13) 18.6-32.7 -2.1-3.3 74-85 415-555 453-498 2.9-2.9 2.1-1.6 89-92 medium high 
UK 1992-2007 not 1998 (#15) 16.8-32.1 0.8-2.2 49-73 64-315 250-709 1.0-1.1 0.3-0.4 54-35 low low 
TOTAL 205 cases  
Notes: (a) The years 1997-2000 are missing for Poland as we cannot differentiate self-employment from dependent employment. For Hungary the year 1996 was excluded as it lacks 
information on contract type. For Ireland we lack information on collective bargaining coverage (CBC), for Slovenia we lack information of public spending, which is why we could not include 
these two countries in our analyses. CBC lagged by two years is furthermore missing for 12 country-years in PT, 6 country-years in CZ and HU, 4 country-years in EL and PL, and 2 country-
years in SK. Finally, we lack information on public spending on families for another country-year in Hungary. Overall, this amounts to a sample size of 205 country-years in 18 countries. (b) 
The values for the macro-level predictors refer to the year that precedes the start and end dates of the country-specific observation windows, because we look at their effect when lagged by 
two years. For example, we show the values of GDP per capita for the years 1993 and 2005 for Austria. (c) The values shown here refer to the degree of regulation on a scale from 0-6 with 
higher values representing stronger regulation, i.e. greater regulation of regular employment in the case of EPL and more legal restrictions on temporary work in the case of TEMP. The 
regression models test the effect of de-regulation of TEMP, however, (i.e. the inverse of the regulation measure).
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 Table A2: Overview of level-2 regressors 
Gross domestic product per capita (GDP): Source: The World Economic Outlook (WEO) database, available 
from www.imf.org, Definition: gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP), per capita, 
(unit: current international dollar). (WEO Subject Code: PPPPC).  
Annual change in GDP per capita: Source: The World Economic Outlook (WEO) database, available from 
www.imf.org, Definition: percentage change of GDP per capita on previous year, constant prize GDP (WEO 
Subject Code: NGDP_RPCH).  
Skill supply: Source: Eurostat, available from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu (extracted 3 January 2010), 
Definition: % of the population aged 25-64 having completed at least upper secondary education (Eurostat 
subject code edat_lfse_08).  
Public spending on families: Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOXC). Definition: Total public 
eǆpeŶdituƌe oŶ soĐial pƌoteĐtioŶ aƌea ͚faŵilǇ͛ ;ďƌaŶĐh=ϱͿ. UŶit: peƌ head, at ĐuƌƌeŶt pƌiĐes aŶd ĐuƌƌeŶt PPs, iŶ 
100 US dollars. This includes public expenditure which supports families (i.e. excluding one-person 
households). It covers expenditure on child/family allowances and credits, childcare support (including 
daycare), income support during leave and sole parent payments. We use separate estimates of spending in 
cash and in kind.  
Employment protection (EPL): Source: OECD, subject code: EPR_v1. Definition: indicator for dismissal of 
employees on regular contracts, quantifying the costs and procedures involved in dismissing individuals or 
gƌoups of ǁoƌkeƌs ;͚fiƌiŶg Đosts͛Ϳ; aŶŶual data, scale from 1-weak/no regulation to 6-strict regulation. For the 
analyses, the continuous variable is used to estimate the main effect of EPR. Additionally, the variable is 
dichotomized (high versus low EPL, the latter referring to values lower than 2.17, which is the case for 6 
countries: Belgium, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, and UK). This dummy measure of EPL is time-invariant at 
country-level and allows for better interpretation of its interaction with the deregulation of temporary work. 
Deregulation of temporary work (TEMP): Source: OECD, subject code EPT_v1. Definition: strictness of 
regulation of fixed-term contracts (i.e. valid cases for use of fixed term contracts, maximum number of 
successive fixed-term contracts, maximum cumulated duration of successive fixed-term contracts) and of 
temporary work agency employment (i.e. types of work for which agency work is legal, restrictions on number 
of renewals of temporary work agency contracts, maximum cumulated duration of successive temporary work 
agency contracts). The original scale from 1-weak regulation to 6-strict regulation is reversed to measure de-
regulation. The variable is mean-centralized around its mean. 
Collective bargaining coverage (CBC): Source: ICTWSS database by Visser (2009). Definition: employees 
covered by wage bargaining agreements as a % of all wage and salary earners in employment with the right to 
bargaining, adjusted for the possibility that some sectors or occupations are excluded from the right to bargain 
(ICTWSS subject code: AdjCov). This indicator is measured annually. Divided by 10, values range from 0-10. 
Values have been imputed in cases where the database provides values for odd years, while the in-between 
value is missing (e.g. in Hungary we observe the same value for 2003 and 2005 but have a missing value for 
2004; in Greece we observe a constant value of 80 in 1990, 1993, 1995 and 1998, while the years in-between 
have missing values). Based on the assumption that we observe an underlying time-invariant time-series 
during these periods, the missing values are replaced by the constant value. Values for eight country-years are 
added by this procedure (2005 for CZ, 2004 for HU, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 2004 for EL).  
Coordination of wage setting (COORD): Source: ICTWSS database compiled by Visser (2009). Definition: The 
variable reflects a 5-point classification of wage-setting coordination distinguishing between 1) economy-wide 
bargaining, 2) mixed industry and economy-wide bargaining, 3) industry bargaining, 4) mixed industry-level 
and firm-level bargaining, and 5) fragmented bargaining, mostly at company level (ICTWSS subject code: 
WCoord). Among the 217 cases (country-years) covered in the model, the time-varying distribution among the 
5 categories is: 8.3%, 11.5%, 19.4%, 54.4%, 6.5%. The variable is collapsed to create a 3-category variable, by 
collapsing categories 1&2 (high) as well as 4&5 (low). For the analysis, a time-invariant measure is created. In 
the majority of cases, the allocation of countries to the three categories is straightforward, as they stay within 
one of the tree categories in the entire observation period (high in AT, BE, DE, EL, NL, SK, low in CZ, FR, HU, PL, 
UK). For the remaining 7 countries, the category into which most of the yearly values fall is used (DK, SE, ES 
and PT are allocated to the medium category and FI, IT and NO to the high coordination category), while those 
ǇeaƌlǇ ǀalues that fall outside this ͚tiŵe-iŶǀaƌiaŶt ĐategoƌǇ͛ aƌe set to ŵissing (the missing category is included 
as a separate dummy in the analysis interacted with CBC).  
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Table A3. Correlation matrix: macro-level variables 
 
Protection 
of regular 
contracts 
Deregulation 
of 
temporary 
work 
Collective 
bargaining 
coverage 
Spending on 
families-cash 
Spending on 
families-kind GDP  
GDP 
change  
Protection of 
regular contracts 1.00       
Deregulation of 
temporary work -0.09 1.00      
Collective 
bargaining 
coverage  
 0.27 -0.51 1.00     
Spending on 
families-cash  -0.23 0.35 0.17 1.00    
Spending on 
families-kind -0.15 0.23 0.17 0.55 1.00   
GDP  -0.09 0.13 0.28 0.66 0.66 1.00  
GDPchange  0.05 0.15 -0.15 0.03 0.02 -0.02 1.00 
Skill stock -0.07 0.59 -0.20 0.61 0.53 0.40 0.14 
 
